Forgotten but not gone: the recall and recognition of self-threatening memories by Green, Jeffrey D. et al.
 Mnemic Neglect Model 1 





Forgotten but not Gone: 
The Recall and Recognition of Self-Threatening Memories  
 
 
Jeffrey D. Green  
Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
Constantine Sedikides 
Aiden P. Gregg 





  Mnemic Neglect Model 2 
Abstract 
When people selectively forget feedback that threatens the self (mnemic neglect), are those 
memories permanently lost or potentially recoverable? In two experiments, participants 
processed feedback pertaining either to themselves or to another person. Feedback consisted of a 
mixture of positive and negative behaviors exemplifying traits that were both central and 
peripheral to participants’ self definition. In Experiment 1, participants exhibited poorer recall 
for, but unimpaired recognition of, self threatening feedback (i.e., negative, central, self 
referent), relative to both self affirming feedback (positive, central, self referent) and other 
relevant feedback (positive/negative, central, other referent). In Experiment 2, participants who 
had experienced ego deflation, but not ego inflation, exhibited mnemic neglect for recall, but not 
for recognition. Both experiments imply that, even after being self protectively neglected, self 
threatening memories can still be retrieved. 
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Forgotten but not Gone: 
The Recall and Recognition of Self-Threatening Memories  
  Getting mixed feedback is a recurring fact of life. A long time friend praises one aspect of 
your personality, yet criticizes another. A journal editor compliments your research hypothesis, 
yet complains that you tested it poorly. A romantic partner showers you with accolades one 
moment, yet heaps imprecations on you the next. Just how do people process positive and 
negative information about the self? In particular, how do people protect the self from negative 
information? 
  Under the assumption that perceivers seek to form accurate social impressions, person 
memory research has proposed various hypotheses to account for how individuals encode, store, 
and retrieve behavioral information about others. Variables such as prior expectancies, number 
and type of behaviors, and processing goals have all been examined (Hamilton & Garcia 
Marques, 2003; Smith & Queller, 2001; Srull & Wyer, 1989). The question arises, however: Can 
research of this sort be extended to memories of behavioral information about oneself? 
Moreover, might memories about oneself differ from memories about others? And might any 
such differences stem from a stronger motive to form favorable impressions of oneself than of 
others? We submit that the answer to all these questions is yes. 
The Mnemic Neglect Model 
Tenets 
  The mnemic neglect model (Sedikides, Green, & Pinter, 2004) portrays the self concept 
as a rich, well organized, and predominantly positive mental representation, significantly shaped 
by emotion and motivation (McConnell & Strain, 2007; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Tracy & 
Robins, 2007). The main aim of the model is to account for the processing of self threatening 
feedback. In contrast to person perception theory, which holds that perceivers, guided by  Mnemic Neglect Model 4 
accuracy concerns, strive to resolve inconsistencies in how they view others, the model 
postulates that individuals strive to maintain the positivity of their self conceptions (Baumeister, 
1998; Brown & Dutton, 1995; Sedikides & Strube, 1997), principally by protecting the self from 
unfavorable social feedback (Burris & Rempel, 2004; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Newman, 
Duff, & Baumeister, 1997). 
  The model draws three key distinctions: between feedback whose implications are 
positive versus negative; between feedback pertaining to traits that are central (i.e., relatively 
certain, descriptive, and important, like trustworthy and kind) versus peripheral (i.e., relatively 
uncertain, undescriptive, and unimportant, like modest and uncomplaining); and between 
feedback referring to oneself versus someone else. Feedback that (a) is negative, (b) pertains to 
central traits, and (c) refers to oneself, is defined as self threatening. Three other categories of 
feedback can also be defined: self affirming (positive, central, self referent); other relevant 
(positive/negative, central, but other referent); and tangential (positive/negative, other 
referent/self referent, but peripheral). 
  The thrust of the model is that people fail to process self threatening feedback thoroughly. 
Self threatening feedback (e.g., You would refuse to lend classnotes to a friend who was ill) will 
receive relatively shallow processing (Brown & Craik, 2000; Craik, 2002). Thus, less long term 
elaboration will ensue, resulting in fewer retrieval routes, and ultimately poorer recall. In 
contrast, self affirming feedback (e.g., You would help a handicapped neighbor paint his house) 
will receive relatively deep processing. Thus, greater long term elaboration will ensue, resulting 
in more retrieval routes, and ultimately better recall. The same will also be true for other relevant 
feedback: despite referring to another person, it nonetheless pertains to important traits, thereby 
maintaining interest and cognitive processing. In contrast, tangential feedback, which pertains to  Mnemic Neglect Model 5 
unimportant or peripheral traits, will receive relatively shallow processing, regardless of its 
referent or valence. 
Evidence 
  In experiments designed to test the mnemic neglect model, participants are presented with 
feedback in the form of discrete behaviors (see Appendix, Original Set). These behaviors vary by 
being either positive or negative, and by exemplifying either central or peripheral traits (e.g., 
central: kind versus cruel; peripheral: modest versus immodest), resulting in four classes of 
behaviors (i.e., positive central; negative central; positive peripheral; negative peripheral). Some 
participants are led to believe, or are asked to imagine, that they might personally perform these 
behaviors. Other participants are led to believe that the behaviors might be performed by another 
generic person (Chris). This design feature permits a direct comparison of self referent and other 
referent memory when participants are given a surprise recall task. The typical finding is that 
participants show poorer recall for self threatening behaviors (i.e., self referent negative central) 
than for either self affirming (i.e., self referent positive central) or for other relevant behaviors 
(i.e., other referent positive/negative central). It is this recall disparity between self affirming and 
self threatening behaviors (in the backdrop of other relevant or tangential behaviors) that we 
have termed mnemic neglect.  
  Mnemic neglect has been demonstrated in laboratory contexts high in mundane realism. 
For example, in one study (Sedikides & Green, 2000, Experiment 1), participants received 
feedback ostensibly from a computer administered personality test. As a prelude to receiving it, 
they first answered an array of plausibly phrased questions from a personality inventory 
described as valid, reliable, and widely used. Participants then waited for the computer to 
calculate their results and provide them with their “personality profile,” allegedly consisting of 
behaviors that the participant was “highly likely to perform.” In a surprise recall task  Mnemic Neglect Model 6 
administered after a short break, participants showed selective neglect of self threatening 
behaviors relative to affirming behaviors. The same pattern is obtained when participants believe 
that the source of the feedback is an acquaintance, working with them on a dyadic task (Green, 
Sedikides, Pinter, & Van Tongeren, 2007). In addition, however, mnemic neglect occurs even 
when participants merely imagine receiving feedback (e.g., Sedikides & Green, 2000, 
Experiment 2). The fact that mnemic neglect occurs under such minimal conditions attests to 
both the spontaneity and robustness of the effect. 
  Additional research has revealed mnemic neglect to be strategic: individuals do not 
indiscriminately neglect all negative self referent feedback, but only the most threatening 
feedback. Green and Sedikides (2004) manipulated feedback diagnosticity—the degree to which 
behaviors define or imply an underlying trait. (Highly diagnostic behaviors alone had been used 
in all previous experiments.) Behaviors that are both negative and high in diagnosticity are liable 
to threaten the self, because their unflattering implications would be clear cut. In contrast, 
behaviors that are negative but low in diagnosticity are liable not to threaten the self, because 
their unflattering implications are equivocal. The hypothesis was confirmed: mnemic neglect 
emerged only for negative feedback that was high as opposed to low in diagnosticity. In a similar 
vein, Green, Pinter, and Sedikides (2005) manipulated the perceived modifiability of personality 
traits. They hypothesized that negative feedback about fixed traits would be found threatening 
but that negative feedback about modifiable traits would not (cf. Roese & Olson, 2007). They 
reasoned that, whereas the latter could be understood as a form of constructive advice that 
facilitates future self improvement, no such positive construal could be managed of the former. 
Accordingly, before participants received the standard behavioral feedback, participants were led 
to believe that the central traits concerned were either modifiable (i.e., flexible, malleable, and  Mnemic Neglect Model 7 
inconsistent) or fixed (inflexible, unchangeable, and consistent) across the lifespan. As 
hypothesized, mnemic neglect emerged for fixed traits only, not for modifiable ones.  
  As stated above, the mnemic neglect model posits that people are strongly motivated to 
believe that they are good and to defend this belief. Mnemic neglect, then, serves a self 
protective function. In this regard, it resembles repression (Freud, 1915; Greenwald, 1981; Terr, 
1994), in particular what Erdelyi (2006) has recently termed inhibitory repression. This involves 
“cognitive avoidance (non thinking) of some target material [that] leads to loss of accessible 
memory” (p. 499). The concept of inhibitory repression is rooted not only in Ebbinghaus’ (1885) 
work, showing that the simple exclusion of stimuli from consciousness leads to forgetting, but 
also in contemporary work, demonstrating that forgetting can be intentionally induced 
(explanations for which include retrieval inhibition, selective search, and selective rehearsal: 
Anderson, 2001; Anderson & Green, 2001; Bjork, 1989; Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman, 1983; 
Levy & Anderson, 2002; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Ford, 1997; Roediger & Crowder, 
1972). Indeed, inhibitory control is more successful for negative than neutral memories (Depue, 
Banich, & Curran, 2006). From this perspective, then, the neglect of self threatening feedback is 
one species of inhibitory repression (Sedikides & Green, 2006). 
  But what exactly does shallow processing, cognitive avoidance, inhibitory repression, or 
mnemic neglect involve? That is, how do individual allocate processing resources to threatening 
self referent information? To address this question, we (Green, Pinter, & Sedikides, 2007) 
carried out an experiment in which we directly manipulated type of processing for self referent 
feedback. Participants were instructed to consider why some behaviors described them 
(integration judgments) and why other behaviors did not (separation judgments). Integration 
judgments led to better recall, whereas separation judgments led to poorer recall. This pattern of 
results suggests a possible mechanism for mnemic neglect. If information is self affirming, then  Mnemic Neglect Model 8 
it is integrated with or connected to stored self knowledge. In contrast, if the information is self 
threatening, then it is separated or disconnected from stored self knowledge.  
  Also relevant here is a key experiment in which we manipulated the time available for 
participants to process behavioral feedback (Sedikides & Green, 2000, Experiment 3). Half the 
participants had ample time (8 seconds) to read each individual behavior (presented one by one, 
at random, via computer), whereas the other half had only limited processing time (2 seconds). It 
transpired that mnemic neglect emerged in the ample time condition, but not in the limited time 
condition. To be specific, when reading time was ample, recall for all classes of behaviors was 
relatively better, except for behaviors that threatened the self, namely those that provided 
negative central self referent feedback. Evidently, participants selectively inhibited thinking 
about self threatening feedback relative to self affirming feedback other relevant feedback, and 
tangential feedback. Thus, the pattern is consistent with the possibility that people make 
separation judgments when confronted with self threatening information, but integration 
judgments when confronted with self affirming (and perhaps other) information (Green et al., 
2007). 
The Mystery of Neglected Memories 
  One key and unresolved issue for our model is this: What happens to the neglected 
memories? Is self threatening information permanently lost? Or are stored traces of that 
information still available for subsequent recovery? 
  One theoretical and empirical perspective suggests that, once forgotten, memories—
including self threatening ones—are well and truly gone: memory decay implies permanent loss 
(Ganaway, 1989; Holmes, 1990; Loftus, 1993; see Loftus & Davis, 2006, for a recent review). 
This view, however, can be challenged on two grounds (at least in the case of non traumatic 
memories; Erdelyi, 2006). First, many “lost” memories can be recovered simply with retrieval  Mnemic Neglect Model 9 
effort (Erdelyi, 1996; Payne, 1987; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978). Second, memories can be 
recovered through routes other than recall. Indeed, recovery through such alternative routes is 
what defines implicit, procedural, and recognition memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Nobel 
& Shiffrin, 2001; Rovee Collier, Hayne, & Colombo, 2000). Ultimately, the empirical 
observation that seemingly absent memories can still be subtly present led to postulation of 
multiple memory systems (Roediger, Marsh, & Lee, 2002; Roediger, Rajaram, & Geraci, in 
press; Tulving, 1987). 
  The distinction between recall and recognition is of particular relevance to the present 
research. Compared to recall measures, recognition measures are generally regarded as more 
sensitive tools for memory recovery (Anderson & Bower, 1972; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997; Srull, 
1984). The person memory literature also furnishes some relevant evidence. Two meta analyses 
found an overall advantage in recall for behaviors inconsistent (as opposed to consistent) with 
prior impressions (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992), though recognition 
results differed. Note how this effect would tend to inhibit the emergence of mnemic neglect, 
given that self threatening feedback is inconsistent with the normative positivity of the self 
concept. The fact that mnemic neglect emerges nonetheless underscores the robustness of the 
phenomenon.  
Hypotheses 
  The autobiographical memory literature has established that negative information is 
generally remembered more poorly than positive information (positivity bias: Kennedy, Mather, 
& Carstensen, 2004; Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, & Shannon, 1991; Walker, Skowronski, & 
Thompson, 2003). The mnemic neglect model additionally states that this pattern is exacerbated 
for negative information about important traits that one possesses. So far, however, research on 
both autobiographical memory and mnemic neglect has employed measures of recall. However,  Mnemic Neglect Model 10 
given that (a) memories that have been seemingly forgotten can be subsequently retrieved, (b) 
recognition is more sensitive to such memories than recall, and (c) discrepant findings for 
measures of recall and recognition have already emerged in the person memory literature, we 
hypothesized that self threatening information, even when it becomes inaccessible to recall, will 
nonetheless remain accessible to recognition. Hence, we predicted that mnemic neglect would 
emerge on measures of recall but not on measures of recognition.  
  To be sure, the recognition of self threatening information, like the recall thereof, relies 
partly on explicit recollections of previously encountered material. However, unlike recall, 
recognition also capitalizes upon feelings of familiarity. It is the latter retrieval route—which 
does not require the detailed traversal of the associative pathways formed during processing 
(Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Heekyeyong, 2006; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999; Yonelinas, 
2002)—that we expected to negate the usual mnemic neglect effect, by permitting access to less 
well elaborated (i.e., self protectively inhibited) memory traces. 
Overview 
  We report two experiments. All participants (a) were introductory psychology students at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC CH), (b) attended in groups of up to seven 
persons, (c) sat in visually isolated cubicles, and (d) were debriefed upon finishing. In both 
experiments, participants completed surprise measures of recall and recognition after having 
received mixed feedback in the form of 32 behaviors that either they or another person would be 
hypothetically likely to perform. Experiment 2 also featured an additional manipulation of threat 
sensitivity. Between subject cell sizes were roughly equivalent. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Validation of Stimulus Behaviors  Mnemic Neglect Model 11 
  Past research (Sedikides, 1993, 1995; Sedikides & Green, 2000) had established that 
university (including UNC CH) students regard the traits trustworthy and kind as central but the 
traits modest and uncomplaining as peripheral. In the present experiment, each of these four traits 
was exemplified by eight behaviors (four positive, and four negative)—the same 32 behaviors 
employed by Sedikides and Green (2000; Experiments 1 3). These exemplars had already been 
pilot tested (see Sedikides & Green, 2000) to ensure that they were (a) highly positive or 
negative, (b) highly important to perform or not to perform, and (c) highly diagnostic of intended 
traits (i.e., the behavior is informative regarding whether or not the individual is described by the 
underlying trait).  
  Thus, an extra set of 32 behaviors exemplifying the same traits was required to serve as 
control or lure behaviors for the recognition task. This new set was derived from two sources: 16 
central behaviors used in a previous experiment (Sedikides & Green, 2000, Experiment 4); and 
16 newly constructed peripheral behaviors. Care was taken so that the new behaviors were as 
similar as possible to the old ones. The Appendix contains the complete list of 64 behaviors.  
Participants and Experimental Design 
  One hundred and seventy eight participants were randomly assigned to between subjects 
conditions. Data were discarded from seven participants who misunderstood the recall 
instructions and recorded trait words rather than behaviors, and from two participants who wrote 
more than three intrusions (e.g., writing down a behavior that was not presented). The 
experimental design was a 2 (Referent: Self vs. Chris) x 2 (Behavior Set: Original vs. New) x 2 
(Behavior Type Order: Central First vs. Peripheral First) x 2 (Behavior Valence Order: Positive 
First vs. Negative First) x 2 (Behavior Type: Central vs. Peripheral) x 2 (Behavior Valence: 
Positive vs. Negative) factorial. The first four factors were between subjects, the last two within 
subjects. All are explicated below.  Mnemic Neglect Model 12 
Procedure 
  The procedure was identical to that of Sedikides and Green (2000, Experiment 2), with 
some important additions. Participants read 32 behaviors under one of two instructional sets. In 
the Self condition, participants considered the behaviors with reference to themselves. At the top 
of each page, they were reminded to “consider the following description of YOURSELF. Think 
of the description as being based on actual knowledge of people who know YOU well. Think of 
the description as real.” In the Chris condition, participants considered “a description of a person 
named CHRIS. Think of the description as being based on actual knowledge of people who know 
CHRIS well. Think of the description as real.” This manipulation constituted the Referent factor 
(Self vs. Chris). 
  Eight behaviors exemplified each of four trait dimensions. The two central trait 
dimensions were trustworthy untrustworthy and kind unkind; the two peripheral trait dimensions 
were modest immodest and uncomplaining complaining. This constituted the Behavior Type 
factor (Central vs. Peripheral). Four positive and four negative behaviors represented each trait 
dimension. This constituted the Behavior Valence factor (Positive vs. Negative). Also, half of the 
participants read the original 32 behaviors whereas the remaining half read the new ones. This 
constituted the Behavior Set factor (Original vs. Novel). Finally, two between subjects order 
variables (Behavior Valence Order and Behavior Type Order) were retained from previous 
research (Sedikides & Green, 2000).
1  
  Participants read through the packet of behaviors at their own pace for about 5 minutes 
and then engaged in a distractor task for 2.5 minutes. Next, the packet of behaviors was replaced 
by a booklet of blank slips of paper. Participants were instructed to generate as many behaviors 
as they could remember in any order that the behaviors came to mind (recall task). In addition,  Mnemic Neglect Model 13 
they were asked (a) to write only one behavior per page, (b) not to turn back to previous pages, 
and (c) to attempt to be accurate without worrying about recalling the behaviors verbatim. 
  Participants then engaged in a recognition accuracy task administered on IBM PCs. The 
first computer screen contained the following instructions: “Now we are going to present several 
behaviors to you. Some of these you read before in the booklet, but some are new—you haven’t 
seen them before. We would like you to identify the old sentences and the new sentences. If the 
sentence is old (i.e., you read it before), then press the ‘z’ key, but if the sentence is new (i.e., you 
have not read it before), then press the ‘/’ key.” Participants were instructed to rest their fingers 
on the two keys. The 64 behaviors were presented in the middle of the computer screen in 
random order. 
Results and Discussion 
Data Reduction 
  Recall. Written responses were coded according to a gist criterion (Srull, 1981; Srull & 
Brand, 1983): behaviors were counted as correctly recalled if the text conveyed the general 
meaning of the behavior. Intrusions (i.e., writing the same behavior twice, recalling a behavior 
that was not presented, changing the valence of a recalled behavior) were removed prior to data 
analysis. Intrusion rates were low (4.1% of recalled items) and comparable to the low intrusion 
rates reported in other experiments using a similar methodology (Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987; 
Wyer, Bodenhausen, Srull, 1984; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004). The proportion of behaviors 
correctly recalled served as the dependent index. 
  Recognition. Recognition responses—having been derived from a yes no recognition task 
in which participants indicated whether each behavior was “old” (previously seen) or “new” 
(never seen before)—were analyzed using signal detection theory (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; 
Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Swets, 1996). Briefly, the theory assumes that participants seek to  Mnemic Neglect Model 14 
identify a signal (i.e., an “old” item) against a background of noise (i.e., a “new” item). Doing so 
is an inherently probabilistic and error prone task. Accordingly, two normal curves of equal 
variance are used to model respondents’ judgments of signal and noise respectively. For yes no 
recognition tests, one curve represents participants’ judgments about old items (the “signal”), and 
the other curve their judgments about new items (the “noise”). Participants distinguish between 
old and new items on the basis of some decision criterion, answering “old” above it and “new” 
below it. Four types of answer are possible: an old item can be correctly identified as old (a hit); 
a new item can be correctly identified as new (a correct rejection); an old item can be mistakenly 
classified as new (a miss); and a new item can be mistakenly identified as old (a false alarm). 
Accuracy of discrimination (or sensitivity) is typically quantified by d', the normalized hit rate 
minus the normalized false alarm rate. This index, which varies from 0 (no discrimination) to ∞ 
(perfect discrimination), corresponds to the displacement of the two normal curves. It has the 
virtue of being uninfluenced by response bias. Response bias itself can be quantified by c, the 
average of the normalized hit rate and the normalized false alarm rate.
2 This index, which varies 
from  ∞ (always saying “new”) to +∞ (always saying “old”), corresponds to the displacement of 
the criterion from the neutral decision point between the curves. Both d' and c served as 
dependent indices. In addition, we also analyzed recognition accuracy using a non normalized 
index δ—equal to half the proportion of hits plus half the proportion of correct rejections—
because of its greater immediate intelligibility and comparability to the recall index (i.e., 
proportion correct). 
Recall and Recognition Accuracy 
  Although results from recall and recognition measures are typically analyzed separately, 
our hypotheses required an explicit test for whether they converged or diverged. Consequently, 
we conducted a preliminary analysis that included Memory Test Type (Recall vs. Recognition) as  Mnemic Neglect Model 15 
an additional within subjects factor. In particular, we conducted a 2 (Behavior Set) x 2 (Referent: 
Self vs. Chris) x 2 (Behavior Valence) x 2 (Behavior Type: Central vs. Peripheral) x 2 (Memory 
Test Type: Recall vs. Recognition) mixed subjects ANOVA, with repeated measures on the final 
three factors. The accuracy index for recall was proportion correct, while that for recognition was 
δ. 
  We hypothesized that mnemic neglect would compromise the recall, but not the 
recognition, of self threatening feedback. Hence, we predicted that the three way Referent x 
Behavior Type x Behavior Valence interaction that diagnoses mnemic neglect would be present 
for recall but absent for recognition. If so, then a critical four way interaction involving these 
three factors and Memory Test Type should emerge. It did, F(1, 146) = 9.65, p < .002. We report 
subsequent analyses for recall and recognition separately below. 
Recall 
  The data from 169 participants were entered into a 2 (Behavior Set) x 2 (Referent) x 2 
(Behavior Valence) x 2 (Behavior Type) mixed subjects ANOVA, with the last two variables as 
within subjects factors. Table 1 contains resulting means broken down in terms of the last three 
factors, expressing the proportion of total behaviors correctly recalled across participants for that 
condition (e.g., recall of two of the eight negative central behaviors would yield a proportion of 
.25 for that behavior category). 
  The mnemic neglect model predicts a three way interaction among Referent, Behavior 
Valence, and Behavior Type, such that the Referent x Behavior Valence interaction obtains for 
central behaviors but not for peripheral ones. This critical three way interaction indeed proved 
significant, F(1, 153) = 11.40, p < .001.
3 We proceeded to examine the Referent x Behavior 
Valence interaction separately for central and peripheral behaviors.  Mnemic Neglect Model 16 
  Central behaviors. The Referent x Behavior Valence interaction was significant for 
central behaviors, F(1, 153) = 15.90, p < .0005. The mnemic neglect model further predicts that 
the interaction should be driven specifically by the selective neglect of self threatening behaviors 
relative to self affirming behaviors and the corresponding other relevant behaviors. If so, then 
self threatening behaviors should be neglected relative to both self affirming and other relevant 
behaviors. Follow up pairwise comparisons confirmed this to be the case. Participants recalled 
self threatening behaviors less accurately than either self affirming behaviors, F(1, 75) = 11.90, p 
< .0001, or Chris relevant negative behaviors, F(1, 153) = 16.51, p < .0005. In addition, 
participants recalled Chris relevant negative behaviors more accurately than Chris relevant 
positive behaviors, F(1, 78) = 4.28, p < .05, and their recall of Chris relevant positive behaviors 
did not differ significantly from their recall of self affirming behaviors, F(1, 153) < 1. 
  Peripheral behaviors. The Referent x Behavior Valence interaction did not emerge for 
peripheral behaviors, F(1, 153) < 1. This finding accorded with prediction: tangential behaviors, 
which do not matter much, should not be recalled differentially on the basis of referent and 
valence. 
  Behavior set effects. No overall effect emerged for Behavior Set, F(1, 153) < 1. However, 
the factor did interact with Behavior Type, such that a predicted main effect for the latter—that 
central behaviors would generally be recalled better than peripheral ones, F(1, 153) = 109.83, p < 
.0001—was stronger for original than for novel behaviors, F(1, 153) = 15.00, p < .0001. In 
addition, Behavior Set interacted with Behavior Valence, F(1, 153) = 10.86, p < .0005, such that, 
for the original set, more positive than negative behaviors were recalled, whereas for the novel 
set, more negative than positive behaviors were. Crucially, however, Behavior Set did not qualify 
the critical Referent x Behavior Type x Behavior Valence interaction, F(1, 153) < 1, or any other  Mnemic Neglect Model 17 
term in the model. Hence, the two sets can be considered equivalent for the purposes of 
demonstrating mnemic neglect. 
Recognition 
  Accuracy. We predicted that the three way interaction indicative of mnemic neglect (i.e., 
Referent x Behavior Valence x Behavior Type) would not emerge for recognition. We tested this 
using two indices of recognition accuracy, the intuitive δ (displayed in Table 2) and the formal d'. 
In neither case did the three way interaction approach significance, both Fs(1, 146) < 1. Nor did 
any of the two way Referent x Behavior Valence interactions, for Central and Peripheral 
behaviors separately, approach significance, all Fs(1, 146) < 1. Thus, no evidence emerged that 
memories of self threatening feedback, despite becoming selectively less accessible to recall, are 
permanently lost. In the presence of the appropriate retrieval cues, they can be as readily 
recovered (i.e., recognized) as memories of self affirming or other relevant feedback.  
  Only two significant effects emerged for δ and d'. First, central behaviors were better 
recognized than peripheral ones, both Fs(1, 146) > 40.00, both ps < .0005. Second, negative 
behaviors were better recognized than positive ones, both Fs(1, 146) > 10.00, both ps < .001. 
This suggests a general encoding advantage for consequential unflattering material. However, no 
self related motivation is implicated, and the Referent factor is uninvolved. 
  Bias. We used the index c to quantify participants’ propensity to judge behaviors as 
previously seen or previously unseen. Participants were more cautious about claiming to 
recognize central behaviors than peripheral ones, F(1, 146) = 4.51, p < .05. They were also more 
cautious about claiming to recognize negative behaviors than positive ones, F(1, 146) = 11.32, p 
< .0001, an effect that was stronger for peripheral than for central behaviors, F(1, 146) = 6.55, p 
< .02. However, no simple or interactive effects involving the Referent factor emerged.  Mnemic Neglect Model 18 
  Nonetheless, if one compares Self and Chris participants directly within each cell defined 
by the Behavior Type by Behavior Valence interaction, one finds that the former were 
significantly less ready than the latter to claim to recognize central negative behaviors, F(1, 160) 
= 5.48, p < .02, but not to claim to recognize central positive ones (F < 1), peripheral positive 
ones (F < 1), or peripheral negative ones, (F = 1.76, p = .18). Greater reluctance to recognize 
negative central behaviors, when ascribed to oneself as opposed to another, suggests yet another 
attempt to self protect. 
Summary 
  As hypothesized, mnemic neglect emerged on a measure of recall: participants forgot 
feedback more when it was self threatening than when it was self affirming or other relevant. 
This oft obtained pattern, however, did not emerge on a measure of recognition: accurate 
discrimination of old and new items was unaffected by self threat. These discrepant results for 
different memory measures are consistent with self threatening information being encoded into 
memory but being thereafter less accessible to recall than to recognition. Unflattering material, 
though clearly forgotten, is not entirely gone. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
  Our prior research has established that self threat drives the mnemic neglect effect (Green 
& Sedikides, 2004; Green et al., 2005; Sedikides & Green, 2000; Sedikides & Green, 2004). In 
that research, however—as in the current Experiment 1—the self threat has been presented in 
isolation, devoid of context. In contrast, threatening feedback in everyday life is typically 
provided against a backdrop of additional feedback. Moreover, the earlier feedback will, in many 
cases, already have exerted a psychological effect, either by diminishing people’s self esteem 
(ego deflation) or by augmenting it (ego inflation). For example, after first learning that the 
manuscript you submitted to Journal of Experimental Social Psychology has been  Mnemic Neglect Model 19 
unconditionally accepted (ego inflation) or definitively rejected (ego deflation), you might 
subsequently arrive home to find your partner either commending you for always considering the 
children (positive feedback) or denouncing you for never doing the dishes (negative feedback). 
Hence, we wondered how initial ego inflation or deflation influences the processing and retrieval 
of self threatening and self affirming feedback (in comparison to other relevant and tangential 
feedback). Would the motivational nature of mnemic neglect (e.g., Green and Sedikides, 2004; 
Green et al., 2005) again be illustrated? And, crucially, would measures of recall and recognition 
once again yield different patterns of results (Experiment 1, above)? These are the questions we 
addressed in Experiment 2. 
  In Experiment 2, we simulated the ongoing nature of feedback in daily life. In particular, 
we had participants initially receive either critical or flattering feedback from one type of source, 
followed by the usual mixed behavioral information from a different source. The feedback from 
the first source, designed to induce initial ego deflation or inflation, stemmed from an assessment 
of cognitive abilities (i.e., a creativity test). The feedback from the second source, designed to 
induce subsequent mnemic neglect, stemmed from the way familiar others ostensibly perceived 
one’s important social qualities (e.g., trustworthiness, kindness), as in Experiment 1. The idea 
that one round of feedback can influence how another round is received finds fertile ground in 
Tesser’s (2000) substitution principle. According to this principle, psychological resources are 
interchangeable in the self system. This implies that the impact of sequential emotional 
experiences should be transferable.  
  We will now state our hypotheses formally. For recall, we hypothesized that mnemic 
neglect would once again be observed. Moreover, we hypothesized that it would be more 
pronounced following ego deflation than following ego inflation. Shaken by a self diminishing 
experience, ego deflated participants would shy away from self threatening feedback and be  Mnemic Neglect Model 20 
more attuned to self affirming feedback (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993; Campbell, 
Baumeister, Dhavale, & Tice, 2003; Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004). In contrast, buoyed and 
shielded by a self augmenting experience (Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005; Sherman & Cohen, 
2006; Trope, Gervey, & Bolger, 2003), ego inflated participants would be able to take self 
threatening feedback in their stride, and have a reduced need to bolster their self views by 
rehearsing and recalling self affirming feedback. Hence, we hypothesized that recall of self 
affirming feedback would exceed recall of self threatening information in the ego deflation 
condition but not in the ego inflation condition. We also hypothesized that recall of other 
referent and tangential feedback would be unaffected by the prior feedback manipulation.  
  In contrast, we hypothesized no corresponding pattern of results for recognition. Informed 
by past literature (Erdelyi, 2006), and by the findings of Experiment 1, we hypothesized that 
memories of self threatening behaviors would be recovered as successfully as memories of other 
types of behaviors (self affirming, other relevant, or tangential), whether they were preceded by 
ego deflation or by ego inflation. In short, we hypothesized that mnemic neglect would simply 
not emerge on measures of recognition. 
Method 
Participants and Experimental Design 
  Two hundred and thirty two participants were randomly assigned to between subjects 
conditions. Data from 11 participants were excluded: three exhibited more than three intrusions, 
and eight misunderstood recall instructions. The design was identical to that of Experiment 1, 
with the addition of the extra between subjects factor Manipulation Type (Ego Deflation vs. 
Ego Inflation).  Mnemic Neglect Model 21 
Procedure 
  The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the crucial addition of a 
between subject manipulation involving ego deflation or ego inflation prior to presenting the set 
of self referent or other referent behaviors. Participants began by engaging in an ostensible 
creativity task, dubbed the “Lange Elliot Creativity Test.” This bogus test has been used 
successfully elsewhere to provide participants with false feedback (Gaertner, Sedikides, & 
Graetz, 1999; Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998). After rating the personal importance 
of the trait “creativity” on an 11 point scale (1 = not at all important; 11 = extremely important), 
participants spent 5 minutes generating various functional uses for a brick and a candle. Their 
answers were collected and ostensibly graded, while they performed an unrelated distractor task 
(i.e., drawing a map of the campus) for approximately 6 minutes. The feedback indicated 
participants’ relative position on a histogram describing a large sample of UNC CH students who 
had already taken the test. Participants learned either that they had performed poorly, ranking in 
the 31
st percentile (Ego Deflation), or that they had performed well, ranking in the 93
rd percentile 
(Ego Inflation). To reinforce the point, arrows pointed to relevant percentiles. Participants then 
confirmed that they understood the feedback by initialing a line below.  
  Participants then answered three manipulation check questions about how they perceived 
the manipulation, and three further questions about their mood. First, they indicated, on 11 point 
scales, (a) the extent to which they believed that they had succeeded or failed at the creativity 
task, (b) how pleased they were with their performance, and (c) how positive or negative they 
regarded the feedback as being. Next, they rated, also on 11 point scales, how they felt at that 
moment (good bad; happy sad; pleasant unpleasant).  
  Following the manipulation, participants proceeded to the “impression” task. As in 
Experiment 1, they read a description of a person (either themselves or Chris) consisting of 32  Mnemic Neglect Model 22 
single sentence behaviors in a booklet. Having done so, they engaged in the distractor task for 
2.5 min, followed by the surprise recall task. Finally, the 32 previously seen behaviors, and a 
control set of 32 behaviors, were presented on the computer screen, one by one in a random 
order. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
  We computed composite scores for both the manipulation perception questions (α = .79) 
and the mood questions (α = .93). Participants reported more positive perceptions following ego 
inflation (M = 8.56) than ego deflation (M = 6.89), t(221) = 6.44, p < .001. In addition, 
participants were in a better mood following ego inflation (M = 8.56) than ego deflation (M = 
6.89), t(221) = 6.44, p < .0001. We therefore deemed our manipulation successful. 
Data Reduction 
  Recall and recognition data were coded and quantified as in Experiment 1. For recall, 
intrusion rates were again low (4.1% of recalled items). 
Analytic Strategy 
  We predicted a significant five way interaction involving Referent, Behavior Type, 
Behavior Valence, Manipulation Type, and Memory Test Type. More specifically, we expected 
this interaction to split significantly into a pair of four way interactions (Referent x Behavior 
Type x Behavior Valence x Manipulation Type) for each level of Memory Test Type, with that 
for Recall significant, but that for Recognition not. In turn, we expected the four way interaction 
for Recall to split significantly into a pair of three way interactions (Referent x Behavior Type x 
Behavior Valence) for each level of Manipulation Type, with that for Ego Deflation significant, 
but that for Ego Inflation not. Next, we expected the three way interaction for Ego Deflation to 
split significantly into a pair of two way interactions (Referent x Behavior Valence) for each  Mnemic Neglect Model 23 
level of Behavior Type, with that for Central behaviors significant but that for Peripheral ones 
not. Finally, we expected follow up pairwise comparisons to confirm that the two way 
interaction for Central behaviors was driven by the selective neglect of Self referent Negative 
(threatening) behaviors relative to self referent Positive (affirming) behaviors, consistent with 
our hypotheses. 
  Accordingly, we began by running a 2 (Behavior Set) x 2 (Referent) x 2 (Manipulation 
Type) x 2 (Behavior Valence) x 2 (Behavior Type) x 2 (Memory Test Type) ANOVA, with 
repeated measures on the final three factors.
 4 Again, accuracy of recall was indexed by 
proportion correct, and accuracy of recognition by δ. As predicted, a critical five way interaction 
(Referent x Behavior Valence x Behavior Type x Manipulation Type x Memory Test Type) 
emerged, F(1, 185) = 4.65, p < .05. We duly decomposed it into a pair of four way interactions 
(Referent x Behavior Valence x Behavior Type x Feedback Type), one for recall and one for 
recognition, reported separately below. 
Recall 
  Means (proportions correct) for 221 participants, broken down by Referent, Behavior 
Valence, Behavior Type, and Manipulation Type, are displayed in Table 3. The predicted four 
way interaction emerged between Referent, Behavior Valence, Behavior Type, and Manipulation 
Type, F(1, 189) = 6.68, p = .011. We decomposed this into a pair of Referent x Behavior Valence 
x Behavior Type interactions for each level of Manipulation Type. The three way interaction was 
significant for Ego Deflation, F(1, 92) = 10.93, p < .001, but not for Ego Inflation, F(1, 96) < 1.  
  We proceeded by decomposing the three way interaction for Ego Deflation into a pair of 
two way interactions (Referent x Behavior Valence), for central and peripheral behaviors 
separately. The two way interaction was significant for central behaviors, F(1, 93) = 14.64, p < 
.0005, but not for peripheral ones, F(1, 93) < 1.   Mnemic Neglect Model 24 
  Follow up pairwise comparisons confirmed that, for central behaviors, the selective 
neglect of self threatening behaviors relative to self affirming behaviors drove the interaction. 
Participants recalled threatening behaviors less accurately than either self affirming behaviors, 
F(1, 48) = 19.45, p < .0005, or Chris relevant negative behaviors, F(1, 107) = 11.97, p < .001. In 
addition, participants did not differ in how accurately they recalled Chris  relevant positive 
behaviors and either Chris  relevant negative behaviors, F(1, 45) < 1, or self affirming behaviors, 
F(1, 107) < 1.
5  
  Thus, our sequence of a priori predictions for recall was perfectly borne out. Mnemic 
neglect emerged reliably following ego deflation but not following ego inflation.
 However, 
inspection of the means in Table 3 reveals that recall of self threatening (central negative) 
behaviors did not differ significantly between the ego inflation and ego deflation conditions, 
t(108) = 0.65, p < .52, though recall of self affirming (positive central) behaviors was 
significantly higher in the ego deflation condition, t(108) =  3.49, p < .001. Is this problematic 
for the mnemic neglect model? Comparison to positive central recall as well as comparison to the 
equivalent Chris conditions provides the necessary context for the manifestation of mnemic 
neglect. Informed by the results of a previous experiment that manipulated reading time 
(Sedikides & Green, 2000, Experiment 3), in which self threatening recall was the same for 
limited and ample reading time conditions, we suggest that there is a limit to the degree of 
inhibition of threatening information but that individuals can bolster self views by focusing more 
on affirming behaviors.  
  This interpretation is consistent with the non significant Referent x Behavior Valence 
interaction in the Ego inflation condition. This was not because the four relevant means were 
statistically equivalent (as was the case for peripheral behaviors). Rather, self referent recall 
proved inferior to Chris referent recall for both negative central behaviors, F(1, 110) = 30.59, p <  Mnemic Neglect Model 25 
.0001, and positive central behaviors, F(1, 93) = 11.31, p < .001. Following an ego inflation 
experience, individuals may have been less motivated in general to recall self referent behaviors, 
particularly threatening behaviors. In fact, on the basis of recent insights (Roese & Olson, 2007; 
see also Sherman & Cohen, 2006), we suggest that there is a dynamic relationship between self 
affirming and self threatening information, such that elaborative processes for the former 
behaviors will be stronger after a previous ego deflation, but weaker after a previous ego 
inflation. That is, when an individual feels affirmed, the motive to protect the self by selectively 
recalling more self affirming than self threatening information should be muted, whereas, when 
an individual feels threatened, the motive to protect the self should come to the fore, leading to 
increased recall for self affirming versus self threatening information. 
  In order to further explore this interpretation, we examined the internal correlations 
between reactions to the creativity test feedback and recall. We analyzed the ego deflation and 
ego inflation conditions separately for participants who processed the information self 
referentially. In the ego inflation condition, the correlation between reaction to the feedback and 
recall for self threatening behaviors was significant: the more positively they responded to the 
ego inflation feedback, the more they recalled negative central behaviors, r(53) = .33, p < .02. 
This finding is consistent with theory and results of self affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). In the ego deflation condition, the correlation between 
response to feedback and recall for self affirming (positive central) behaviors was marginal, 
r(55) =  .26, p < .06. That is, the more negatively they reacted to the ego deflation feedback, the 
more they recalled positive central behaviors. This correlation appears to support our contention 
that individuals may respond to threat by bolstering their self views via selective recall of 
affirming information. No other correlations between reactions to feedback and any recall or 
recognition indices attained significance.  Mnemic Neglect Model 26 
Recognition 
  Accuracy. As in Experiment 1, two indices of recognition accuracy were used, δ and d'.  
Means for 225 participants
6, expressed as δ, are displayed in Table 4.  
  As predicted, no four way interaction emerged between Referent, Behavior Valence, 
Behavior Type, and Manipulation Type for either δ or d', both Fs(1, 193) < 1. Nor, collapsing 
across Manipulation Type, did the three way interaction between Referent, Behavior Valence, 
and Behavior Type approach significance, either for δ, F(1, 193) < 1, or for d', F(1, 193) = 1.53, 
p = .23. Thus, like in Experiment 1, no evidence of mnemic neglect emerged on measures of 
recognition. 
  Bias. As in Experiment 1, c served as the index of recognition bias. None of the previous 
effects observed replicated.
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Ruling Out Mood as an Explanation for the Recall Results 
  As previously mentioned, participants in the ego inflation condition reported a more 
positive mood than those in the ego deflation condition. However, when mood was entered as a 
covariate, none of the recall effects changed significantly. Thus, we can rule out mood as an 
explanation for the divergent recall findings between the ego inflation and ego deflation 
conditions. These findings echo the results of related research, in which mood fails to moderate 
the effects of negative feedback (e.g., social exclusion; Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & 
Twenge, 2005).  
Summary 
  Results were again consistent with the hypotheses. For recall, mnemic neglect was 
significantly moderated by the recent experience of ego deflation or ego inflation, emerging 
reliably after the former but vanishing after the latter. For recognition, mnemic neglect failed to 
emerge in either case. Thus, Experiment 2 again found both that self protection prompts the  Mnemic Neglect Model 27 
neglect of central negative feedback, but that such neglect is not the result of offending memories 
being eliminated. Rather, their latent traces can be unearthed through recognition. 
General Discussion 
  In a previous part of this program of research (Green & Sedikides, 2004; Green et al., 
2005; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004), we simulated, in the experimental laboratory, social 
situations in which people receive mixed social feedback. In particular, participants received real 
or imagined feedback from familiar others (e.g., friends, employers, partners), consisting of both 
positive and negative elements, and referring both to central and peripheral aspects of 
personality. We repeatedly found that people showed selectively poorer recall for self threatening 
feedback (i.e., negative in implication, and pertaining to central aspects of personality) compared 
to self affirming (i.e., positive central) or other relevant feedback. We labeled this phenomenon 
mnemic neglect, and characterized it as a species of self protection (Sedikides et al., 2004). In 
this article, we addressed an important unresolved question arising out of this research: Are the 
forgotten memories of self threatening feedback permanently lost or potentially recoverable?   
  Evidence exists that many memories which cannot be initially recalled can nonetheless be 
subsequently recovered, either with retrieval effort (Payne, 1987; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978) or 
through recognition (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997; Wyer et al., 1984). Given that forgotten 
memories can nonetheless persist, and that recognition measures can be sensitive to their 
presence, we hypothesized that mnemic neglect would be present on measures of recall 
(replicating past research) but absent from measures of recognition. The results of Experiment 1 
duly confirmed these hypotheses.  
  In Experiment 2, we proceeded to investigate a potential moderator of mnemic neglect, 
again using parallel measures of recall and recognition. In Experiment 1, and our own past 
research (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2004), the mixed feedback was a once off affair. However, in the  Mnemic Neglect Model 28 
real world, different waves of feedback often follow in swift succession, with one wave being 
psychologically processed in the context of another. Consequently, we wondered, how would the 
prior receipt of favorable or unfavorable feedback, leading to either ego inflating or ego 
deflation, affect the magnitude of the mnemic neglect effect? We hypothesized that, whereas 
ego inflation would undermine mnemic neglect by affirming and shielding the self system 
(Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Trope & Neter, 1994), ego deflation would promote it by fostering 
additional self protective motivation (Campbell et al., 2003; Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004). In 
addition, we hypothesized that these dynamics—which would again underscore the motivational 
nature of mnemic neglect—would only be apparent on measures of recall, not on measures of 
recognition. The results of Experiment 2 confirmed these hypotheses. 
  The mnemic neglect model may help to explain the cognitive underpinnings of other 
established effects, such as the positivity bias in autobiographical memory (Walker et al., 2003), 
positive illusions about the self (Taylor & Brown, 1988), and the self serving attributional bias 
(Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). If one is especially prone to forget negative details 
about oneself on topics of consequences, then it is easy to see why one’s life might appear rosy in 
retrospect, why one might remember only the positive points of one’s personality, or why one 
might remember only one’s own contributions to one’s success. At the same time, the recall 
versus recognition findings we report may also help resolve the paradox of why such robust self 
enhancing biases exist despite the fact that negative information generally garners greater 
attention (Fiske, 1980; Pratto & John, 1991) and is generally accorded greater weight 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). We suggest a resolution along the lines of 
Taylor’s (1991) mobilization minimization hypothesis, according to which a negative event (e.g., 
self threatening feedback) initially elicits a vigorous, rapid, and direct response (e.g., reacting 
strongly against criticism), followed by a more measured, prolonged, and indirect response (e.g.,  Mnemic Neglect Model 29 
not thinking about it). The former, mobilization, seeks to undo or contain the negative event, 
whereas the latter, minimization, seeks to dampen or erase its impact. When it comes to negative 
feedback, we suspect that people firstly mobilize by challenging and counterarguing its 
implications (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Edwards & Smith, 1996) but secondarily minimize by 
distancing themselves from it (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995) or not thinking about it 
(Erdelyi, 2006). We submit that mnemic neglect, and many other biases in favor of self, occur at 
the minimization stage, whereas negativity biases occur at the mobilization stage. 
  This resolution also suggests that using different memory strategies (e.g., recognition), or 
inducing individuals to actively reflect on negative information, may reduce self related biases to 
which mnemic neglect contributes. In keeping with this suggestion, Sedikides, Horton, and 
Gregg (2007) reported that participants who reflected on why they might or might not possess 
negative central traits (e.g., untrustworthy, unkind, unfriendly) rated themselves more 
unfavorably on those traits than control participants did. 
  Stereotyping research (von Hippel, Jonides, Hilton, & Narayan, 1993; Sherman, Lee, 
Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998) suggests that stereotypes facilitate quick and efficient coding of 
consistent items (i.e., good conceptual processing) relative to inconsistent items, but that less 
attention is paid to the details of the stimulus (i.e., poor perceptual processing). This system is 
flexible and efficient, and one implication of this model is that under cognitive load, more 
processing resources are allocated to inconsistent items (i.e., longer attention and better 
perceptual encoding), although conceptual processing of consistent items is still superior 
(Sherman et al., 1998). Might these processing styles have some bearing on the processing of 
self threatening and self affirming information? We are skeptical for two reasons. First we have 
found that reading time for self threatening and self affirming information does not significantly 
differ (Green & Sedikides, 2007). Second, recognition of self threatening (inconsistent)  Mnemic Neglect Model 30 
information in the present experiments was not higher than recognition of self affirming 
(consistent) information. However, future research could more directly test this proposition by 
manipulating cognitive load, assessing reading time, and measuring both conceptual and 
perceptual processing (e.g., by providing a richer stimulus set and assessing how well perceptual 
details are recalled), or by directly pitting processing of threatening and affirming information 
against each other (Sherman et al., 1998). In addition, a “think aloud” protocol might shed light 
on the type of encoding as well as further empirically examine the integration and separation 
judgments that we have proposed.  
  Our current findings open up several additional interesting possibilities for future 
research. In Experiment 2, ego inflation apparently muted the generally pervasive motivation for 
maintaining a glowing self concept. Could other social situations activate different motivations 
and override the often preoccupying self protection motive? For example, would mnemic neglect 
be absent under conditions in which the self improvement motive is activated (Kurman, 2006)? 
Another question concerns the cross cultural generalizability of our findings: Is the mnemic 
neglect effect universal (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 
2005) or restricted to individualistic cultures (Heine, 2005; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999)? In addition, what role might idiosyncratic self views play in mnemic neglect? 
Although in past research we have not found differences across some demographic variables or 
individuals high versus low on the traits (trustworthiness and kindness) exemplified by the 
stimulus behaviors (Sedikides & Green, 2004, Experiment 2), future research should examine 
whether mnemic neglect is moderated by such individual differences as self esteem (Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2004), narcissism (Campbell & Green, 2007), or repression (Newman & McKinney, 
2002). Finally, to what extent might affective states such as happiness, sadness, anger, or shame  Mnemic Neglect Model 31 
influence mnemic neglect, either directly or indirectly via effects on processing style (Wegener & 
Petty, 1994)?  
  In conclusion, our research showed that self threatening memories are accessible and 
recoverable in normal adults. Our findings complement relevant literature in clinical psychology 
(Erdelyi, 2006), and take a step toward bridging the theoretical and methodological gap between 
the self perceptions and person perception literatures. Empirical inquiry into the cognitive 
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Table 1 
Experiment 1: Mean Recall Accuracy (with Standard Deviations) as a Function of Referent, 
Behavior Type, and Behavior Valence 
 
 
  Central Behaviors  Peripheral Behaviors   
 
  Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative 
 
Self referent  .39 (.17)  .30 (.17)  .19 (.17)  .23 (.17) 
Chris referent  .36 (.17)  .40 (.18)  .21 (.15)  .23 (.16) 
 
Note. Values reflect the mean proportion of correctly recalled behaviors from each set of eight 
defined by the interaction of Behavior Valence and Behavior Type.  Mnemic Neglect Model 42 
Table 2 
Experiment 1: Mean Recognition Accuracy (with Standard Deviations) as a Function of 
Referent, Behavior Type, Behavior Valence, and Response Type 
 
 
  Central Behaviors  Peripheral Behaviors   
 
  Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative 
 
  Self referent  .86 (.11)  .88 (.09)  .82 (.14)  .84 (.13) 
  Chris referent  .88 (.10)  .88 (.09)  .81 (.12)  .85 (.13) 
 
 
Note. Values (δ) were derived by converting mean hits (previously seen behaviors, judged as 
such) and mean correct rejections (previously unseen behaviors, judged as such) into proportions, 
and then by averaging the result, for each set of eight behaviors defined by the interaction of 
Behavior Valence and Behavior Type.  Mnemic Neglect Model 43 
 Table 3 
Experiment 2: Mean Recall Accuracy (with Standard Deviations) as a Function of Manipulation 
Type, Referent, Behavior Type, and Behavior Valence 
 
 
  Central Behaviors  Peripheral Behaviors 
 
  Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative 
 
Ego Inflation 
  Self Referent  .30 (.15)  .33 (.21)  .18 (.17)  .22 (.18) 
  Chris Referent  .47 (.17)  .46 (.19)  .21 (.15)  .23 (.16) 
Ego Deflation 
  Self Referent  .44 (.23)  .30 (.19)  .18 (.15)  .23 (.16) 
  Chris Referent  .40 (.17)  .43 (.21)  .20 (.17)  .23 (.18) 
 
Note. Values reflect the mean proportion of correctly recalled behaviors from each set of eight 
defined by the interaction of Behavior Valence and Behavior Type.  Mnemic Neglect Model 44 
Table 4 
Experiment 2: Mean Recognition Accuracy (with Standard Deviations) as a Function of 
Manipulation Type, Referent, Behavior Type, and Behavior Valence 
 
 
  Central Behaviors  Peripheral Behaviors 
 
  Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative 
 
Ego Inflation 
  Self Referent  .89 (.09)  .86 (.09)  .85 (.11)  .85 (.13) 
  Chris Referent  .90 (.09)  .91 (.11)  .83 (.12)  .88 (.10) 
Ego Deflation 
  Self Referent  .90 (.10)  .92 (.08)  .82 (.11)  .85 (.10) 
  Chris Referent  .88 (.10)  .91 (.09)  .79 (.10)  .83 (.12) 
 
Note. Values (δ) were derived by converting mean hits (previously seen behaviors, judged as 
such) and mean correct rejections (previously unseen behaviors, judged as such) into proportions, 
and then by averaging the result, for each set of eight behaviors defined by the interaction of 
Behavior Valence and Behavior Type. 
  Mnemic Neglect Model 45 
Footnotes 
1 For each trait dimension, we randomized the order of behaviors presented (to control for 
recency and primacy effects), under the constraint that no more than two behaviors of the same 
valence appeared sequentially (Behavior Valence Order). We also used two randomization 
patterns: the first, presented to half the participants, started with a negative and ended with a 
positive behavior; the second, presented to the remaining half, started with a positive and ended 
with a negative behavior (being the mirror image of the first). Also counterbalanced was the 
order in which central and peripheral behaviors appeared (Behavior Type Order). Half the 
participants read the central behaviors first, and half read the peripheral behaviors first. In the 
data analysis of both experiments, these two between subjects order variables were included in 
the model, but are not included in the model description for the sake of presentation clarity. No 
substantive effects involving either order variable emerged, rendering our decision to omit them 
from the model description easier. 
 
2 Traditionally, response bias in signal detection paradigms has been quantified by (the natural 
logarithm of) β, which represents the ratio of the heights of the signal and noise distributions at 
the decision criterion (McNicol, 1972, pp. 62 63). However, it may be less plausible to assume 
that respondents base their decisions on a likelihood ratio than on the actual position of decision 
criterion (Richardson, 1994). In addition, c has two advantages over log β: it is unaffected by 
changes in d' (McNicol, 1972, pp. 63 64) and it is computationally simpler. We express c such 
that positive values indicate a bias towards detecting a signal (i.e., an “old” item; Snodgrass & 
Corwin, 1988). In cases where the proportions on which c  is based equal unity or zero, a value of 
.5 ÷ k, where k is number of signal or noise trials, can be subtracted or added to facilitate 
computation (similarly for d' ; McMillan & Kaplan, 1985).   Mnemic Neglect Model 46 
3 The Referent x Behavior Valence interaction, which has been consistently obtained in prior 
research (e.g., Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004), was also significant in both Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. The pattern was identical, with participants recalling fewer negative than positive 
behaviors for self, but more negative than positive behaviors for Chris. 
4 As in Experiment 1, the two order variables are included in the model, but omitted from the 
description. No substantive effects involving the order variables were significant. 
 
5 Effects for the Behavior Set factor generally resembled those in Experiment 1. Crucially, this 
factor did not qualify any key interactions (e.g., Referent x Behavior Type x Behavior Valence). 
Full details are available from the authors. 
6Several participants responded to only 63 behaviors during the recognition task due to a 
programming error. One behavior for each participant was randomly omitted. The accuracy 
proportions were corrected accordingly. 
7A significant Behavior Valence x Behavior Type x Manipulation Type did emerge, F(1, 193) = 
8.56, p < .005, but resists obvious explanation and is in any case irrelevant to our hypotheses. 
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Appendix 
 
  All participants considered the 32 behaviors below that reflect the traits trustworthy, kind, 
uncomplaining, and modest. All eight behaviors reflecting the same trait were presented on the 
same page. When Chris allegedly performed the behaviors, Chris replaced the self as the author 
of the behavior, and the sentences were altered slightly to remove all pronouns, allowing 
participants to infer that Chris was either male or female. 
 
Original Set 
Trustworthy and Untrustworthy Behaviors 
I would borrow other people's belongings without their knowledge. 
I would keep secrets when asked to. 
I would be unfaithful when in an intimate relationship. 
I would follow through on a promise made to friends. 
I would often lie to my parents. 
An employer would not rely on me to have an important project completed by the deadline. 
A teacher would leave me alone in a room while taking a test and not be afraid that I would 
cheat. 
People would be willing to tell me embarrassing things about themselves in confidence. 
 
Kind and Unkind Behaviors 
I would make fun of others because of their looks. 
I would offer to care for a neighbor's child when the baby sitter couldn't come. 
I would purposely hurt someone to benefit myself. 
I would help people by opening a door if their hands were full. 
I would refuse to lend classnotes to a friend who was ill. 
I would make an obscene gesture to an old lady. 
I would help a handicapped neighbor paint his house. 
I would volunteer time to work as a big brother/big sister to a child in need. 
 
Uncomplaining and Complaining Behaviors 
I would look for faults even if my life was going well. 
I would rarely inform others about physical ailments. 
When I would not like to do something, I would constantly mention it. 
I would overlook the bad points about a roommate.   Mnemic Neglect Model 48 
I would constantly talk about how much stuff there is to be done. 
I would pick only the bad points to describe the classes I attend. 
I would minimize bad experiences when telling about them. 
I would tolerate situations even when not having a good time. 
 
Modest and Immodest Behaviors 
I would act in a condescending manner to other people. 
I would take the focus off myself and redirect it to others. 
I would point out others' weaknesses to make myself look better. 
I would let some of my achievements go by unaccredited. 
I would talk more about myself than about others. 
I would like to show off in front of others. 
I would give others the credit for a group success. 
I would never openly brag about my accomplishments. 
 
New Set 
Trustworthy and Untrustworthy Behaviors 
I would completely forget about an important meeting at work. 
I would not report a large source of income on my income taxes.  
I would not pay back money that I owed to a friend. 
I would gossip about a good friend to other people. 
I would remember to pick things up for a friend. 
I would handle confidential tasks at work successfully. 
When I found a wallet containing a lot of money, I would track down the owner and return it. 
Even though I had a lot of work, I would not cheat on a homework assignment. 
 
Kind and Unkind Behaviors 
I would ignore someone at a party that I didn’t know very well. 
I would criticize a friend’s boyfriend or girlfriend in front of my friend. 
I would refuse to lend money to a brother or sister. 
I would get in a heated argument with someone over a minor issue. 
I would take care of a sick friend for several days. 
I would drive a friend around while his/her car was being repaired. 
I would help my roommate study for a difficult exam even though I had a great deal of work to 
do. 
I would take care of a friend’s pet for the entire summer.  Mnemic Neglect Model 49 
 
 
Uncomplaining and Complaining Behaviors 
I wouldn’t say anything if food was overcooked at a restaurant. 
I wouldn’t get mad if a friend promised to call but forgot.  
I would simply smile if someone was rude to me. 
I wouldn’t really comment negatively about politicians that I disliked.  
I would complain about my boss to co workers. 
I would gripe when a roommate didn’t keep the place neat and clean. 
I would criticize a friend if she or he was late meeting me. 
I would get irritated and comment loudly if the weather was bad. 
 
Modest and Immodest Behaviors 
I would change the subject if someone praised me. 
I wouldn’t publicize it to many people if I got an award or honor.  
I would talk about a friend’s successes more than my own. 
I would downplay my good performance at work. 
I would openly brag to friends about a good grade. 
I would look down on some people because of their background or dress. 
I would boast about winning a game or sporting contest. 
I would ignore certain types of people at a party.  Mnemic Neglect Model 50 
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